Monday, February 22, 2021

Time to put on our thinking caps: Inquiry in Social Studies

 

As an educator in training, inquiry is a significant part of my vision for teaching. My philosophy is based on the use of objects primarily because objects are our most direct portal to the past. Therefore, my vision of what an inquiry based social studies lesson looks like includes objects and artifacts. Imagine using stamps or other small artifacts on the student’s desks and asking the students to “write down everything you can about your object and tell the class about it.” Here, the students would use their skills as observers to draw information to assist them in making discoveries. During this lesson, I would instruct my students to sketch their artifact. This type of inquiry-based activity is a great way to introduce a new subject and spark a lifelong love of social studies.

Inquiry is a method of instruction based on answering a question or solving a problem using evidence. This method of teaching builds and refines the student’s skills in observing, critical thinking and cross examination. To answer a question, students must learn to read and interpret primary sources. They must learn not to take every written word as law or fact. Over time, the truth gets lost and as class historians, students must learn to piece together answers. The point of the inquiry method is to show cause and effect. It can develop skills in chronological thinking for younger elementary school students. According to an article entitled “What is an Inquiry Lesson,” educators must begin by introducing a question and follow a structured set of subsequent steps (History Education Group, 2018). For example, the teacher must predetermine a set of sources the students will use to investigate and come to a reasonable conclusion (History Education Group, 2018).

 I believe that students should be taught the skill of searching for the correct primary and secondary sources to find answers. The study of history closely resembles investigating a crime scene. Part of the process is gathering witnesses (primary sources) and cross-examining them. Another skill is the ability to find leads that can bring the student to another book, record, document or artifact. By preselecting the array of sources students are able to peruse, educators are failing to train young historians in these vital skills. According to the article, students learn to form a hypothesis and revise it based on changes in the evidence (History Education Group, 2018). This effectively teaches students that historians aren’t always correct and that sometimes the accepted theory must be rewritten or altered. The best example of this idea can be found in the realm of art history. Many paintings and drawings have gone in and out of an artist’s accepted body of works primarily due to technological innovations. New ways of investigating paintings reveal things which discredit a previous theory.

Inquiry in social studies can also assume the form of a class debate. Here, students are responsible for finding evidence to support their position on a given topic or question. According to “What is an Inquiry Lesson,” it is important that educators use questions that require the use of historical evidence rather than moral discussion (History Education Group, 2018). For example, “Why did Teddy Roosevelt oppose segregation in California’s public schools?”, requires investigation of historic sources to come to a plausible conclusion (History Education Group, 2018). On the other hand, a question such as “Should the United States have used the atomic bomb?”, is far more of a moral debate (History Education Group, 2018).

One of my approaches to inquiry with social studies is the Gutenberg printing press project which I have discussed in previous posts. To build the press, my students and I would have to investigate together (guided inquiry) the basic function and design of the press. I would teach my students how to read technical drawings from the 18th century as well as regular images found on google. I would show them how to visualize how a simple machine like the Gutenberg press works. From those drawings, books and images (and perhaps 18th century documents created on the press), we could solve the problem of how to construct a simple example from safe tools. I could create a similar lesson to teach the first flight. In stead of a question, the students will have a task of creating a model airplane that flies. First, I would model how to find information from books as well as pictures of the first airplane. Next, through their own study, the students will learn the scientific forces (lift, drag, thrust) that cause all airplanes to fly. This way, they will learn by facing the same challenges pioneers like the Write brothers and Sam Langley faced. It is important to note that each student would be given their own set of materials to create an airplane and would be assessed on how high and far it flies! As a future teacher, I would assess the student’s creations during a contest!

As an educator in training, I feel that my understanding of inquiry in social studies has been strengthened. After reading and visualizing my own lessons, I conclude the inquiry method is among the methods with the most pedagogical value. By engaging students with tasks and thoughtful questions, they can learn actively with their hands and minds on. Unfortunately, the current covid19 health crisis has forced us to become more creative with inquiry. As social studies educators, we live in historic times in which virtual instruction has not only changed teaching temporarily but will echo far into the future. 

Reference

History Education Group
 (2018). What is an "inquiry lesson"? Retrieved February 22, 2021, from                       https://teachinghistory.org/teaching-materials/teaching-guides/24123

Thursday, February 18, 2021

Fatal Flaws of The Me-262

 

 Adolf Hitler considered the Me-262 to be a supper weapon capable of wiping out the Allies in a David verses Goliath onslaught. At the end of World War II, he believed in its ability to resurrect a retreating, war-ravaged Germany. Even today, the 262 is often idolized and overpraised. Luftwaffe enthusiasts frequently overlook the hazards and problems that made the jet merely mortal. The reality was that although Germany harnessed jet technology, they were unable to properly harvest its game changing characteristics.

The story of the Me-262 began in April, 1939 when Dr. Wilhelm Messerschmitt presented designs that addressed stipulations issued by the German Air Ministry for a jet aircraft. It was a truly promising design well ahead of its time featuring twin engines and a highly adaptable airframe. The airframe was designed around the new BMW turbojet engine. Messerschmitt’s brain child featured a Pflilflugel (arrow wing) which was a milestone in aircraft design. The swept back wing of the 262 yielded better control at the high speeds attainable by jet aircraft. In time, the design still had to be refined to address the constant stream of problems that popped up during testing and combat service.

By March of 1940, Messerschmitt was awarded a probationary contract to produce the first prototype airframes. One underwent wind tunnel testing on the aerodynamic integrity of the airframe. The others were built as full test flight prototypes. Wind tunnel tests revealed the BMW 003 engines were far too heavy for the wing to adequately support. As a result, the lighter Jumo 004, was chosen but certainly wasn’t without its own laundry list of problems. The hollow turbine blades cracked under intense heat and the turbine wheel was faulty. On 18 April, 1941, test pilot Fritz Wendel flew the very first Me-262 prototype coded V1 PC+UA without jet power. By the first week of November, the twin BMW jet engines were ready and attached to the prototype. It is important to note that the airframe was always ahead of the engines in terms of engineering. Therefore, it wasn’t until the following year that the first Me-262 prototype flew with jet power. 

On 25 March, 1942, Wendel attempted to takeoff with the BMW jet engines. It was definitely a clumsy looking contraption featuring a tail-dragger landing gear configuration causing the shark like nose to point skyward like a massive harpoon. Its two jet engines hung from each wing inside huge nacelles. The back-up Jumo 210 piston engine was housed inside the nose which spun a large wooden propeller that couldn’t possibly have looked more out of place. The back-up Jumo 210 engine was kept because many of the teething problems of the BMW engines still weren’t resolved even at this stage. In the event the jet engines failed, Wendel had the option of using the back-up engine to land the jet and prevent the loss of the prototype. In fact, both jet engines did quit when Wendel was barely of the ground. He was forced to use the back-up piston engine and barely saved the aircraft. Compared to his near-death experience with the BMW engines, the Jumo 004 powered Me-262 V2 PC+UB was a clear improvement. Wendel later praised the hybrid jet but he discovered that the Me-262 was a double-edged sword when it came to performance. He reported that takeoff was extremely difficult. The throttle had to be advanced slowly not to mention the high speed that had to be reached before the jet could lift of. It took a lot of runway to accomplish this, but once in the air, it was a pleasure to fly. That day Wendel reached a top speed of 541mph at 30,000ft however, his flight was cut short by engine failure forcing him to use his auxiliary piston engine yet again to land safely. The short-comings of that first prototype ultimately led to the improvements shown in the subsequent prototypes.

On 18 July, 1942, the piston engine was removed and the third prototype Me 262 V3 PC+UC finally had both feet in the jet age. It was the first prototype to fly on jet power alone. However, it still had that dreaded tail-dragger landing gear configuration. The landing gear made it difficult to lift the tail from the ground as the jet reached flight speed. The excessive turbulence from the engines rendered the controls nearly useless during take-off and landing. Wendel skillfully found ways to overcome some of these problems. On takeoff, Wendel discovered that as he accelerated down the runway and gently tapping the breaks, the tail rose up and the jet took off. It became clear that the Me-262 was not for the faint hearted and should not be flown by inexperienced pilots.

If we fast forward to 6 June, 1943, one year from the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Me-262 prototype evolved significantly and equipped with some new touches. The tail-dragger landing gear configuration which was common for piston engine fighters was altered. Instead, it featured a tricycle landing gear configuration and lighter but not so reliable Jumo 004A-0 engines. The new landing gear solved the previous problems but also created new ones. The nose wheel was flimsy and could not rotate which made it difficult to taxi the aircraft. To address the long takeoff distance, the new prototype was fitted with RATO (Rocket Assisted Takeoff). The results were promising and took 300yds off the jets’ takeoff run. Unfortunately, when Professor Messerschmitt appealed to the German Air Ministry to use RATO for all production Me-262s, they refused. Had they gone along with Messerschmitt’s request, one of the many weak points of the 262 might have been addressed. The lengthy takeoff run ultimately became one of the many unresolved problems that bled into the 262s combat career.  

The closing of 1943 proved to be a pivotal point for the Me-262. On top of the technical problems that slipped through the engineering cracks, the role of the jet was also in question. In December, Adolf Hitler attended a demonstration of the Me-262 at Insterburg. This is where many Luftwaffe historians like to point the finger at Hitler for single handedly murdering the Me-262. According to General Adolf Galland, who attended the demonstration, Hitler declared “For years I have demanded from the Luftwaffe a ‘speed bomber,’ which can reach its target in spite of enemy fighter defense. In the aircraft you present to me as a fighter plane I see the ‘Blitz bomber,’ with which I will repel the invasion in its first and weakest phase”. He believed that by implementing the 262 as a shnellbomber (fast bomber), its speed could allow it to penetrate Allied air-cover and repel the imminent invasion of occupied Europe.  However, Hitler was a layperson who had no business with military strategy and even worse, his tactical decisions clearly stemmed from his obsession with offensive, revenge attacks against England. Galland, on the other hand, had more tactical sense in his finger than in Hitlers entire body and was fully aware that the priority of the Luftwaffe was reclaiming air superiority. In fact, General Eisenhower remarked that the Normandy invasion would not have been possible without the success of the pattern bombing campaign. Albert Speer, who was also present, recorded in his memoirs that every effort was made to convince Hitler about the Jet’s tactical importance as a fighter to help thwart the relentless Allied bombing crusade. Speer recalled the more he and Galland tried to convince Hitler of that, the more he resisted. Was this the moment that murdered the 262? No, Hitler’s unilateral decision to use the jet as a bomber by itself did not delay its production. Rather, it was a variety of factors including that fateful decision. Operation Big Week resulted in the destruction of key 262 factories at Augsburg and Regensburg. On top of that, engine development was always behind the progress of the airframe and production had to wait for the engineers to catch-up. So, production of the Me-262 Sturmvogel (Stormbird) began with only a limited number of fighter variants sneaking off the assembly lines. Its future as the fighter Germany desperately needed looked bleak. So far…

KG-51 was the first bomber unit to transition from conventional aircraft like the Ju-88 to the Me-262 jets. Since the 262 was best suited as a fighter, the decision to use it as a bomber resulted in catastrophic losses. Galland recorded in his memoirs “Actually the ME-262 possessed no fixtures for releasing bombs or bombsights. According to its flying properties and its safety conditions it was highly unsuited for an aimed bomb release, diving or gliding were out of the question because of the unavoidable excess of the permissible top speed”. The pilots of KG-51 had no serious experience with aggressive tactics. Speed, their only saving grace, was stripped away by the ordinance they carried as the additional weight and drag reduced their top speed by 75mph. By now, production Me-262’s received by KG-51 were powered by the first mass produced jet engine in history, the Jumo 004B. Even though the new engine was a clear improvement over previous ones, reliability remained an issue. Engines only lasted about 10 hours before they required replacement and on top of that, fuel consumption was off the charts. The Me-262 was a flying, gas guzzler and its fuel consumption was so inefficient, it could only stay aloft for about an hour. The only good news was that jet engines burned a different type of low-octane fuel that was cheaper and far more abundant called kerosene. The 262’s of KG-51 were not deployed until shortly after the Allied invasion of Normandy. By then the Allies sank their teeth too deep into France to make a difference. It was too late for Hitler’s vision for the 262 to come to fruition. All they could do was carry out nuisance raids against Allied bases throughout France.

 On 26 July, 1944, an Allied fighter pilot squared off with a 262 for the first time. 2nd Leutnant Alfred Schrieber, encountered an RAF Mosquito fighter flown by Flight Lt. Albert E.
“Bert” Wall and navigator Albert Sinclair “Jock” Lobban. Schrieber pursued, opened fire and scored several hits forcing the “mozzie” to disengage and retreat to Fermo, Italy. Mosquito fighters were a major thorn in the side of the Luftwaffe primarily because its wooden construction and twin Rolls Royce Merlin engines gave it fantastic speed. It was fast, nimble and an ideal pathfinder during night bombing raids. But, Schrieber reported the encounter as a victory, when, in fact, the RAF fighter did manage to escape by out-turning him. The false news eventually reached Hitler causing him to believe the Me-262 was the answer to the “mozzie” scourge. The harsh truth is that it wasn’t, at all. The Me-262 had the speed advantage, but it didn’t have a prayer in a turning fight with any Allied fighter.

The first confirmed victory for the 262 was scored by the newly formed unit designated Kommando Nowotny on August 8th. Coincidentally, the victim of the encounter was also an RAF Mosquito fighter. Kommando Nowotny was the world’s first operational all jet combat unit named for its leader, Walter Nowotny. It evolved from Ekdo (Test Command) 262 led by Captain Werner Thierfelder. Only the very elite Luftwaffe pilots made the cut to serve on its roster for obvious reasons. On July 18th 1944, Nowotny’s predecessor, was killed in action over Bavaria. Since Allied records do not indicate that he was shot down, it is reasonable to speculate that a technical problem with his own aircraft may have caused his death. Thierfelders fate is further proof of the 262’s fatal flaws. Handicaps like the 262’s extremely touchy throttle, unreliable engines, flimsy nose wheel and lack of stability during takeoff caused about 200 pilots to die in training alone. Herman Buchner once recalled the failure of his jets nose wheel: “I slammed my 262 onto the landing strip doing two hundred sixty kilometers per hour and suddenly saw a wheel running in front of me. It had broken off the end of the axle during the hard landing and the wheel had now separated. The aircraft swerved to the left, but, with a great deal of effort and additional help from the left engine, I succeeded in keeping the machine going more or less in the right direction and steered passed a fuel truck. After a few frightening seconds I brought my jet to a standstill. All went well, and the machine only needed a new undercarriage.”

Every pilot that climbed in that cockpit had to nurse the throttle with extreme care. Any sudden movements could cause the engines to burst into flames and carene down the runway in an uncontrolled ball of fire. If a successful takeoff was achieved you had to be careful about tight turns and speed reduction when attacking. George Peter Eder described takeoff and landing with the 262: “The throttle response was slow, and if pushed forward too soon resulted in flameouts, so in combat we just set the throttles at full forward and only reduced power gradually as required, such as landing. To bleed off airspeed, we just raised the nose and left the throttles alone. We operated the throttle gently to prevent any quick changes to the engines. Later the automatic throttle regulator was installed on some aircraft, but it did not always solve the problem. The technology was just so new, and we were the guinea pigs, so that was the problem”. The chain that linked the 30mm rounds sometimes broke under the high stress caused by tight turns. Diving at 30-40,000ft where air is cool and thin was relatively safe, but diving at lower altitudes where air is denser meant almost certain death. Drag from the dense air at the edge of the sound barrier caused critical controls to freeze damming the fate of the aircraft. For the first jet fighter pilots, returning to base was also dangerous since they had to reduce their speed. Allied fighter pilots often stalked 262s from a distance waiting for them to land. As German pilots dropped their throttles and flaps lowered, Allied fighters dove out of the sun and shot them down. Unlike conventional fighters, a landing in a 262 could not be aborted because it would take too long to advance the throttle and pick-up flight speed again.

After the initial shock of the 262s debut in battle, Allied fighter pilots learned that the jet could be beaten. For instance, by diving, they could convert altitude to speed and catch the 262. Slower, piston engine fighters could also turn tighter and their ability to suddenly slowdown could force the jets to overshoot them in a dogfight. The primary causes for the meager success achieved by Kommando Nowotny was the position of their bases near the front lines. Allied fighters often circled above known Me-262 airfields waiting to strafe them during takeoff or landing. On 7 October, 1944, 1st Lt. Urban L. “Ben” Drew and his squadron strafed the Nowotny base at Achmer. Drew recalled: “I watched them for a while and saw one of them start to taxi. The lead ship was in takeoff position for a formation takeoff. I waited until they were both airborne and then I rolled over from 15,000 feet and headed for the attack with my flight behind me”. Since it took several minutes for 262s to reach top speed, Drew was able to bag one only 1,000 feet of the ground. The Germans were supposed to have air cover patrols flown by piston engine Fw-109 D fighters from JG-54 but none were around that day. 262 airbases also attempted to cover landing jets with heavy anti-aircraft batteries. On November 8th, the anti-aircraft batteries couldn’t stop Major Walter Nowotnys luck from running out when his port engine burst into flames during an interception sortie, forcing him to return to Achmer. P-51 pilot Edward R. “Buddy” Haydon sighted the flames and quickly closed the range on Nowotnys crippled jet like a shark that smelled blood. They both descended to just 100 feet from the ground putting Haydon safely under the umbrella of flack that erupted from the airfield. Nowotnys fate was sealed as he made his final approach. Since he was flying on one engine, Nowotny was losing speed fast and before Haydon could pull the trigger, the jet stalled and snaped to the left crashing in the forest below.

The 24 October, 1945 mission flown by the Tuskegee Airmen is yet another shining example of how Allied pilots adapted to the Me-262 threat. Not only was it the longest escort mission (1,600 miles) of the war, but it was also their first clash with the jets. They were tasked with escorting bombers from the 15th AF targeting a Daimler Benz tank factory in Berlin. About thirty Me-262 jets from JG-7 arrived to intercept the bombers. Three jets were shot down during the mission by Charles Brantley, Earl Lane, and Roscoe Brown. Brown recalled shooting down Oberleutnant (Lt. Col.) Franz Kulp. “All of a sudden at nine o’clock I saw these streaks. I ordered, ‘Drop your tanks and follow me.’ I did a split S, went under the bombers, did a hard right, pulled up, shot the jet, blew him up and that was the first jet victory for the 15th Air Force”. Earl R. Lane became tangled in a tight left turn with another 262 flown by ace Alfred Ambs. Lane was able to pull lead and open fire from about 2,000 yards. Lane recalled, “He did not quite fill my gunsight. I fired three short bursts and saw the plane emitting smoke. A piece of the plane, either the canopy or one of the jet orifices, flew off. I then pulled up and circled over the spot where he went down. I saw a crash and a puff of black smoke.” The Me-262 was clearly ill equipped to dogfight with piston fighters, but it was hardwired with the tools to bring down heavy bombers.

The pilots of Kommando Nowotny drastically altered their standard interception tactics around the speed of the Me-262. For the Luftwaffe, bombers were typically attacked head-on from twelve o-clock high but that approach would never work for jet pilots. American B-17s flew at about 280mph and the Me-262 knifed through the air at 540mph. The closing speed of the two aircraft in a head-on pass would be too high for any jet pilot to select a target, aim and score hits without colliding with their intended target. That is why the pilots of Kommando Nowotny transitioned away from frontal interception tactics. Instead, 262 pilots hunted American bomber formations from six o-clock high or streaking in from either side. Interception tactics had to be further refined to accommodate the limited range of the 262s armament of four, three-centimeter cannons. Three-centimeter guns only had an effective range of about 250 meters compared to the 800-meter range of .50 caliber guns on a B-17. The limited range of the jet’s cannons made it vulnerable to American gunners. The Luftwaffe patched up the jet’s Achilles heel by equipping the 262 with twenty-four R4M rockets. Since the rockets had an effective range of 900-1,200 meters, pilots could knock down bombers before flying in range of gunners.   

Yes, the 262 put a dent in the number of Allied bombers but the damage was already done. The pattern bombing campaign brought Germany’s war effort to its knees forcing the feared Me-262 into a dark, cryptic underworld. Since factories above ground were being destroyed at such an alarming rate, the Germans resorted to a cheap and haphazard solution by converting mines into underground factories throughout the Reich. The REIMAHG (Flugzeuwerk Reichmarshall Herman Göring) factory was a porcelain mine located in the Walpersberg hill near Kahla. There, gaunt prisoners from concentration and POW camps replaced trained workers Germany was critically short on. They constructed bunkers with steel-reinforced concrete up to 10 meters thick rendering the factory nearly bomb-proof. The components of the 262 were sent from the Messerschmitt Co. for final assembly at the REIMAHG. Assembly of main components (wings, fuselage and tail) took place above ground inside concrete bunkers along the base of the hill. Across the hilltop stretched a 3,300-foot runway for the factory fresh jets to be launched from for delivery to their combat units. Delivering the jets to their combat units was a daunting task. Since the runway was barely long enough for takeoff, RATO was required and there was no turning back. Use of unskilled labor should have caused significantly more accidents during delivery to the front lines as well as during combat. Surprisingly, the only known accident occurred on 23 February, 1945 resulting in the death of Feldwebel Otto Soltav near Calbe. It is reasonable to hypothesize that since the components of the 262 were manufactured at the Messerschmitt Co., the skilled work was already completed. By the time the preassembled components arrived, the prisoners were left with the final assembly of the aircraft. Since the 262 was a significant problem for Allied heavy bombers, 262 bases also became high priority tactical targets. Frequent bombing and strafing of 262 bases forced them to retreat to the shadows of forests and under bridges. The haphazard conditions surrounding the 262s late war production made it even more of a danger to its own pilots.

 Even though Germany’s fate was sealed in utter defeat, she certainly won the race to the jet age. The Me-262 was undoubtedly the most successful of the Luftwaffe’s experimental endeavors. By the end of the war, 262s shot down about 542 total Allied aircraft to the loss of only 100 jets in air-to-air combat. Although about 1,400 Me-262s were produced by the end of the war, only 300 ever saw combat. The 262 certainly instilled fear in the hearts of Allied pilots but it arrived too late to ever achieve tactical success. For Hitler, the 262 was nothing more than a pipe-dream and a last-ditch attempt to resurrect victory from defeat. One thing remains certain, the 262 changed air combat forever both technologically and tactically and became the aviation standard for all future conflicts.

The Luftwaffe's Kamikaze

 

By the twilight of 1944, the Luftwaffe was virtually destroyed as a fighting force and could no longer shield Germany from impending doom using conventional methods. Although certain defeat loomed ahead, Adolf Hitler and many of his closest confidants still believed that victory could be salvaged by implementing unconventional weapons known as “Wunderwaffen” and other highly unusual projects. One such operation called “Wehrwolf” was launched on April 7th, 1945, just one month before Germany’s surrender. Hundreds of young pilots were recruited and tasked to ram their modified Bf-109 fighters into American bombers. In the long run, Luftwaffe command intended to shock the Allies into suspending daylight bombing raids long enough for the new Messershmitt-262 jet fighter to be deployed in large enough numbers to turn back the tide of war.

Germany was bombed flat and greatly resembled a post-apocalyptic world. There were tired, hungry, homeless, and injured individuals roaming the streets and hiding under toxic rubble. On top of the horrific scenery, civilians chocked on the ripe stench of the dead rotting beneath it. At night instead of beautiful lights illuminating the city, there were small, flickering fires. Berliners simply burned anything that could keep them warm. Hitler’s promise to deliver a Germany that would be unrecognizable to the rest of the world during his rise to power was certainly realized but not as he intended. In spite of the extensive devastation, Germany’s will to fight was still far from broken.

            At the time, Adolf Hitler blamed Reich Marshall Göring and several other high-ranking commanders for the Luftwaffe’s failures causing him deep disgrace. His only path to redemption was to accomplish the impossible task of repelling the entire Eighth Air Force with only a handful of operational aircraft and untested pilots. Germany’s supply of raw materials was in a critical state which meant access was limited exclusively to top priority programs. Many subordinate commanders such as Hajo Hermann, Otto Skorzeny, Oberst Edgar Peterson, and Hanna Reich believed the only way to deliver such losses to the Allies was by implementing “Totaleinsatz”; meaning suicide attack. She proposed the establishment of “Selbstopfermänner” meaning self-sacrifice men. Reich’s popularity as a key Luftwaffe test pilot gave her great influential power but ultimately, her idea was never realized because Hitler refused to implement outright suicide attacks. He stated that he didn’t require his pilots to lay down their lives as the Japanese did across the globe. However, if the situation required self-sacrifice, then they were expected to do so. He continued to entertain unconventional ideas where the risk of death was far greater than normal.

            Otto Skorzeny suggested modifying the existing V-1 rockets to accommodate a pilot. The pilot of such a craft would not be intended to survive the mission. Skorzeny believed the use of a human pilot would ensure pin-point accuracy and greatly paralleled the Japanese Okha program. Regular V-1 rockets were unguided and operated using automatic gyros which kept the rocket on course using the horizon. The rocket was highly temperamental and inaccurate. To make matters worse, the rocket was slower than most Allied propeller driven aircraft and could be easily shot down. In addition, the piloted V-1 would not be equipped with a forward firing armament leaving the pilot defenseless. With a small cockpit added along with some basic rudimentary controls, it could be guided to hit strategically valuable Allied targets. Implementing such a radical solution would require a strong fighter escort which the Luftwaffe was ill- equipped to provide. Clearly, suicide was not the only reason Skorzeny’s idea was rejected. At this point, it was clear to the Luftwaffe’s high commanders that suicide was off the table and as a result, ideas quickly evolved from suicide to ramming.

            Two figures emerged as rival contenders for the Luftwaffe’s final solution. The first was Oberst Edgar Peterson who presented a plan similar to the earlier “Mistel” project. The “Mistel” was an unpiloted bomber packed with explosives and guided via remote control from an Fw-190 or Bf-109 fighter. The fighter was attached to the massive bomber which towed it into the air. When the target was in range of the craft, the pilot launched the bomber from its undercarriage and guided it using a remote control installed in the cockpit. Peterson’s proposal also would use bombers packed with extra explosives. The discrepancies between the “Mistel” program and Paterson’s vision were many. First, the bombers themselves were to be piloted and didn’t have to be carried into battle by another aircraft. His plan was to pack bombers with extra explosive and wire them to a timer which the pilot could manually trigger. Then, the pilot would aim the bomber at a formation of Allied bombers, engage the timer, and bail out shortly before impact. Although the pilot was intended to survive the mission, the chances of survival was only the toss a coin. The potential of Peterson’s idea was never realized probably because of the extremely limited success of the “Mistel” project as it only sank two Allied warships.

            Finally, Cornel Hajo Hermann submitted the idea that received Reich Marshall Goering’s approval. Without a doubt, his successful career with the Luftwaffe gave him an edge over other contenders presenting their visions in front of the humiliated Goering. He was a born leader and a skilled tactician. Since boyhood, Hermann was extremely enthusiastic about flight and often participated in gliding competitions. By 1935, he officially joined the Luftwaffe (just 5 months after its official formation) and once again, he got to fly his old pride and joy (gliders) during his training for combat. He became a bomber ace by sinking 12 allied ships flying Ju-88s. He also served in Poland, Greece, Norway; and England during the Battle of Britain. By 1942, he was promoted to General der Kampflieger and became responsible for the development of Germany’s bomber force. From that point on, he became a staunch advocate of reducing Germany’s bomber production and increasing fighter production. Unfortunately, it came to no avail because the German High Command still believed in an offensive campaign against the Allies using bombers. His prestige may not have been enough to influence Germany’s bomber production but it was enough to have his final solution approved by Göring in late 1944.

            Hermann’s blueprints for the mission involved using conventional Bf-109 fighters to ram allied bombers. Ramming was not an unfamiliar concept to Luftwaffe command. Prior to the deployment of the Sonderkommando Elbe, there was a unit known as the “Sturmgruppen.” Its pilots were instructed to ram bombers only as a last resort. The pilots flew heavily armored Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and were usually accompanied by an escort of regular fighters. Hermann believed if 800 fighters attacked and only half of them destroyed their targets, the allies would suspend all daylight bombing raids over Germany. He believed that the allies would be shocked into suspending raids for four to six weeks which would give Germany enough time to deploy sufficient numbers of the new Me-262 jet fighter. The Me-262 was vastly superior to the best Allied fighter in service. It was the world’s first operational jet fighter and could fly up to one hundred miles per hour faster than the fastest Allied fighter; the P-51 Mustang. To make matters worse, it was equipped with four 30mm cannons housed in its shark-shaped nose which could disintegrate Allied bombers with just a few solid hits. Luftwaffe high command believed in spite of the fuel shortage that deploying the Me-262 in great numbers alone would be enough to turn the tide of World War II. Hermann’s original plan called for about 1,500 Bf-109 high altitude fighters to be stripped of their weapons and armor. By stripping the aircraft down, it’s performance would be greatly enhanced and enable them to climb faster which was imperative for the mission. This would enable them to climb out of the reach of the Allied escort fighters and dive on the bombers from above at a fairly steep angle. Each 109 was fitted with only a single 13mm machine gun for self-defense making it ideal for the mission.

 The pilots were young volunteers with no combat experience. Goering advertised the mission as “top secret” and “dangerous” during February 1945. Shockingly, over 2,000 student pilots volunteered. Stupidity, fear, and ignorance probably played a much bigger role than bravery when the young pilots decided to volunteer for the mission and definitely had no idea what to expect. This was far too many for the limited number of fighters initially promised for the operation. Over 1,500 Bf-109 fighters were to be delivered for the operation but by March, the number dwindled to a few hundred primarily because maintaining the war effort at the front lines took priority over Hermann’s attack. As a result, only the most qualified pilots were chosen for the mission. Trainees that logged at least 50 hours in a Bf-109 were eligible to begin training for the ramming mission. The pilots were kept in the dark about the details of the mission until their arrival at Stendel where Cornel Herman personally briefed them. Here, their rudimentary and rushed training began.

            By the end of March, Hermann’s plan was finally being implemented. Three groups of ramming units were deployed near the Elbe River which was located along known bomber routes. Unfortunately, only 180 Bf-109 fighters were properly modified for the mission at the time and couldn’t fulfill Hermann’s original request of 800 fighters. They were escorted by Me-262 jet fighters from Kommando Nowotny. Shortly after take-off, many unfortunate pilots discovered their planes were not flyable and had severe engine trouble which further reduced their strength down to only 120 fighters. At this point, it was nothing more than sending men to the slaughter. Even if all 120 flyable bf-109s destroyed their target, that would amount to only one quarter of Hermann’s intended success rate. In other words, if every fighter destroyed one bomber, it still would not have mattered. For the German’s, the only practical function of the mission was that it provided false hope.

 Once the fighters were airborne, they were vectored to the bombers by radio. The pilots were instructed at Stendal to select their own individual targets rather than use the Luftwaffe’s traditional method of attacking in groups. Then, after a steep climb, the pilots were instructed to dive on the target at a high speed while aiming his fighter at the bomber’s key weak points. Such areas included the wings, the ball turret, the tail surfaces or the cockpit. On April 7th, the numbers of the Eighth Air Force bombing raids were awesome in comparison to the meager 120 Bf-109s. It wasn’t even a David and Goliath comparison. The bombers totaled 1,300 strong accompanied by a fighter escort of 800 fast, agile, elegant P-51 and P-47 fighters. The Sonderkommando Elbe pilots must have been shocked to discover that air combat was nothing like they expected and to make matters even worse, their mission wasn’t even a normal interception mission.

 Imagine being stuffed into the highly claustrophobic cockpit of a Bf-109 fighter. The undercarriage is narrow which could cause the aircraft to tip over. The canopy slams shut when it dawns on you that the Bf-109 is likely to be your coffin. The intense vibrations of the engine fill the cockpit. It feels like a giant picked you up and started shaking you violently. In the chaos, the crewmen wave you off with no pre-flight check leaving your fate tied to your aircraft. Shortly after take-off, it’s time for the high G climb toward the Allied bombers. It feels like two to three hundred pounds are pushing you in your seat and a black curtain slowly descends over your field of vision. Your training was rushed and your body simply is not prepared and if you don’t release pressure on the stick soon, you will pass out. You begin searching the sky for Allied fighters but the glare of the plexiglass canopy makes it difficult to see anything clearly. In addition, the 109 does not have a bubble canopy and therefore, you can’t see what’s behind you. Suddenly, a wingman is shot down shortly after reaching 40,000ft by fighters swarming around the formation. You can hear the crunching sound of the aircraft being torn apart. A long black trail of smoke belches from the flaming engine shortly before unleashing an explosion that echoed across the sky and ripping apart the formation. Now you are alone and surrounded by American fighters. These were the sights and sounds experienced by pilots like Heinrich Henkel, Heinrich Rosner and Clouse Hahn who survived the mission.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divisions from the Eighth Air Force were dispatched to destroy strategic targets throughout Germany.  The 398th Bomb Group was routed to destroy a munitions factory in Krummel. Other strategic targets included and ordinance depot in Güstrow, oil tanks in Büchen and marshalling yards near Neumünster. The Güstrow ordinance depot was located near the eastern front which made it an important target for the 3rd AD. Its destruction would hurt the Germans ability to supply their infantry units. Aircraft from the 487th BG from the 3rd Air Division targeted an Me-262 base at Parchim. The destruction of Me-262 airfields was extremely important not only because it was a superior aircraft but because it was significant in Hermann’s plan. Once the Allies were frightened into temporarily suspending bombing raids, the 262 would be made available in sufficient quantities to repel the relentless Allied bombing campaign. The 262 was designed to destroy bombers. Using its speed and heavy armament, it could accelerate far beyond its normal top speed and shoot down Allied planes before the pilots knew what hit them. They were too fast for turret gunners to track them across the sky and were flown by the Luftwaffe’s most experienced pilots. Before any of this could come to pass however, the young Luftwaffe pilots of the Sounderkmmando Elbe squadron had to complete their suicidal mission.

 They were instructed to begin a steep dive from a safe altitude above the targeted bomber formation. Heinrich Rosner dove on a formation of B-24s from about 7,000ft above the formation. He overshot his target and quickly found himself meandering through the 31 B-24s of the 398th BG. He maneuvered his fighter so close to the other bombers that their gunners could not open fire on him. When he finally meandered his way to the lead planes at the front of the formation, he swung his fighter outside the formation and then banked right positioning himself to impact the cockpit of the lead plane called Palace of Dallas. According to Rosner, shortly after impact with the Palace of Dallas, the momentum carried him into the deputy lead bomber flying next to it. Terror and the urge to turn away would have filled the German’s heart. On impact, Rosner would have heard crushing, screeching, and groaning of metal. Rosner recalled being thrown around the cockpit like a rag doll before he finally bailed out. The projected survival chance was only ten percent and after studying Rosner’s attack, it is reasonable to understand why. If the pilot wasn’t shot down by enemy fighters or turret gunners, the pilot would most likely die in the violent impact. If the pilot was lucky enough to survive to bail out of the aircraft, there was no shortage of problems that further reduced chances of survival. For example, a bullet in the right place could jam the canopy shut. In addition, the parachute could fail to deploy as they often did. Allied fighters sometimes shot the pilots down floating down with their parachutes. After bailing out and surviving the mission, pilots were indeed expected to repeat the unthinkable ordeal.

            The crews aboard the bombers were probably just as frightened as the Germans who were tasked with ramming them. Just imagine the sense of fear and helplessness as Colonel John Herboth watched Rosner’s 109 scream toward his plane with no indication of turning away. The Palace of Dallas was the lead plane in a formation of about 1,500 bombers and escort fighters. On impact, the pilot, co-pilot and group C.O. were killed instantly and only three crewmembers managed to bail out. When Rosner careened into the deputy lead bomber flying nearest to the Palace of Dallas, the Pilot quickly lost control and the bomber quickly flipped over. The extensive negative G-forces from being inverted consequently disintegrated the bomber. Although the aircraft met a terrible fate, the entire crew managed to escape. Bailing out of an aircraft at 40,000ft must have been an incredibly trying ordeal for bomber crews. At 40,000ft, oxygen levels are extremely low not to mention it’s also freezing. Many pilots who bailed out of their aircraft at this altitude probably lost consciousness. If you have ever gone skydiving from 10,000ft, imagine jumping from four times that altitude unable to see the ground because of cloud cover. It must have been truly daunting.

 Bombers during WWII were pressurized similarly to today’s commercial aircraft. Each bomber had an oxygen supply that dispensed it to the crew. However, in the case of a B-24 called Sacktime everything changed after it was rammed by Heinrich Henkel. He recalled that shortly before impact he saw Sacktime’s tail gunner, Robert Perkins, put his hands up in terror. The right wing of Henkel’s Bf-109 sliced through Sacktime’s right vertical stabilizer and his propeller drilled an enormous hole in the fuselage. Shortly after impact, Henkel’s Bf-109 violently cartwheeled over the left wing of his victim and fell out of the sky trailing thick black smoke. Heinkel recalled being thrown from the aircraft shortly before what remained of it exploded. After being violently thrown from his fighter he “played dead” because he was aware that sometimes Allied fighters shot down pilots hanging from their parachutes after bailing out. Henkel finally deployed his parachute at about 4,000ft and became one of the few survivors of the mission.

 

 Aboard Sacktime, the ruptured fuselage caused the bomber to lose pressure and oxygen. If the oxygen system was damaged than the pilot, Robert Winger, would have to descend to a lower altitude. However, with the right vertical stabilizer sheered off, control of the bomber was extremely limited. Winger and copilot, Jeff Nard, had to apply full right rudder and aileron just to keep the aircraft aloft. Sack Time continued to lumber through the sky with the left wing dipped 30 degrees. Once they arrived over the A-92 airfield near St-Truiden in Belgium, Winger assessed that the bomber could not be landed safely and ordered the crew to bail out. In spite of the tremendous damage to Sacktime, the entire crew survived.

            Fortunately, most of the bombers and their crews landed safely even after being rammed and Budd Wentz’s plane and crew are yet another example. Wentz piloted a B-17 called My Best Bette with the 487 BG. The 487th was tasked with bombing the Me-262 base at Parkem. He and his crew were unaware that they were targeted by Clouse Hahn. Hahn almost didn’t survive the ramming mission and from the very beginning, he faced set-back after set-back. Shortly after take-off, Hahn encountered engine trouble and was quickly separated from the main formation of attacking aircraft. With his engine sputtering, he then encountered a small formation of P-51 Mustang fighters which he mistook for German 109s. To his surprise, the aircraft surrounded him and opened fire. Hahn later recalled during an interview that “It wasn’t a dogfight. It was a barrage”. Rounds shredded his cockpit and fuselage causing him to tumble out of the sky uncontrollably. As he plummeted earthward, he began to re-gain control of the aircraft and his senses. Hahn later recalled, “I don’t know why I still rammed. I won’t say it was courage. It was desperation”. In his descent, he began to see the shapes of B-17 bombers from the 487th BG with the 3rd AD and pulled out of the dive colliding with Wentz’s plane. The entire aircraft shuddered as the propeller of Hahn’s 109 shredded the tail surfaces rendering the rudder and elevator controls useless. Wentz quickly accelerated ahead and out of the formation to avoid any further collisions. He realized that use of the aircraft’s ailerons could cause the bomber to flip over and calculated another way to control his plane called differential thrust. By increasing power to two engines and decreasing power to the opposite two, it causes the aircraft to turn in that direction. He ordered the crew to drop the ordinance and prepare to bail out. Fortunately, Wentz was able to safely land the plane safely at an emergency airbase in Belgium. Hahn, on the other hand, had a far more turbulent experience. After the impact, he was knocked unconscious and his extensive blood loss didn’t help. The tumbling fighter threw him from the cockpit and didn’t open the parachute until he free – fell to only 5,000 feet.   

 The results of the mission firmly demonstrated that the German’s staunch belief in salvaging victory from certain defeat was a fantasy. Combat records show that the Allies shot down about 59 German fighters. Most of them were probably from the Sonderkommando Elbe. Out of the 120 fighters that took off and made it to the bombers, only 8 successfully hit their target and only 2 bombers were destroyed. Unlike the Japanese, the Germans believed that resorting to suicide tactics was defeatist and unglamorous. The mission accomplished little more than instilling terror in the hearts of the Allied pilots for a single day. Nevertheless, the Allied bombing offensive pressed on. Although there was nothing the Luftwaffe could do to turn the war around in Germany’s favor, the implementing of ramming missions certainly demonstrated their will to fight to the end. The ramming mission flown by the Sonderkommando Elbe on April, 7, 1945 was their only attack. Due to the mission’s dismal results, the program was promptly scraped. 

 Afterword

As a professional historian, I regularly use the skills that I intend to teach my students. To successfully study history, students must learn the skills I used in composing this article which was published in November 2020 in World at War magazine. Think of research as a crime scene and your objective is to find out who did it. This is the correct approach to the study of history an one of the best techniques here is cross examination. I read several books and in stead of taking their word at face value, I looked for the discrepancies between the authors writing, the words of those who were there and other authors. When you learn how to read between the lines, you can begin to uncover some truths. Unfortunately, I did not have much to go on in terms of research for this paper because there are few written accounts of the April 7th mission. To make matters worse, the AAF was aware of the situation and purposely hid the truth from bomber pilots and crews. Therefore, original documentation and literature about this is scarce which is the reason I chose to write this piece. In terms of education. I am aware of why I fell in love with this aspect of our history and therefore know how to inspire a strong foundation for a lifelong interest. When I was in my second year of high school, I played a video game called "Secret Weapons over Normandy." It was an older game for the Playstation 2 but I remember enjoying it and becoming excited about the aircraft in the game. As I continued to play, it sparked my curiosity causing me to investigate the truth about the airplanes in the game. After I did my homework, I found that many of them did exist! I went on to study these unconventional aircraft and have even seen them in person in museums! 

I took this photo of a German Me-262 jet fighter in 2014 shortly before my last year of my undergraduate study. This is the National Air and Space Museum in Washington D.C.

 

 


Chapter 13

  As a graduate student studying education, much of my knowledge comes from my text. I have learned a great deal about Geography instruction...