Adolf Hitler considered
the Me-262 to be a supper weapon capable of wiping out the Allies in a David
verses Goliath onslaught. At the end of World War II, he believed in its
ability to resurrect a retreating, war-ravaged Germany. Even today, the 262 is
often idolized and overpraised. Luftwaffe enthusiasts frequently overlook the
hazards and problems that made the jet merely mortal. The reality was that
although Germany harnessed jet technology, they were unable to properly harvest
its game changing characteristics.
The
story of the Me-262 began in April, 1939 when Dr. Wilhelm Messerschmitt presented
designs that addressed stipulations issued by the German Air Ministry for a jet
aircraft. It was a truly promising design well ahead of its time featuring twin
engines and a highly adaptable airframe. The airframe was designed around the
new BMW turbojet engine. Messerschmitt’s brain child featured a Pflilflugel (arrow
wing) which was a milestone in aircraft design. The swept back wing of the 262
yielded better control at the high speeds attainable by jet aircraft. In time,
the design still had to be refined to address the constant stream of problems
that popped up during testing and combat service.
By
March of 1940, Messerschmitt was awarded a probationary contract to produce the
first prototype airframes. One underwent wind tunnel testing on the aerodynamic
integrity of the airframe. The others were built as full test flight
prototypes. Wind tunnel tests revealed the BMW 003 engines were far too heavy
for the wing to adequately support. As a result, the lighter Jumo 004, was
chosen but certainly wasn’t without its own laundry list of problems. The
hollow turbine blades cracked under intense heat and the turbine wheel was
faulty. On 18 April, 1941, test pilot Fritz Wendel flew the very first Me-262
prototype coded V1 PC+UA without jet power. By the first week of November, the
twin BMW jet engines were ready and attached to the prototype. It is important
to note that the airframe was always ahead of the engines in terms of
engineering. Therefore, it wasn’t until the following year that the first
Me-262 prototype flew with jet power.
On
25 March, 1942, Wendel attempted to takeoff with the BMW jet engines. It was
definitely a clumsy looking contraption featuring a tail-dragger landing gear
configuration causing the shark like nose to point skyward like a massive
harpoon. Its two jet engines hung from each wing inside huge nacelles. The
back-up Jumo 210 piston engine was housed inside the nose which spun a large
wooden propeller that couldn’t possibly have looked more out of place. The
back-up Jumo 210 engine was kept because many of the teething problems of the BMW
engines still weren’t resolved even at this stage. In the event the jet engines
failed, Wendel had the option of using the back-up engine to land the jet and
prevent the loss of the prototype. In fact, both jet engines did quit when
Wendel was barely of the ground. He was forced to use the back-up piston engine
and barely saved the aircraft. Compared to his near-death experience with the
BMW engines, the Jumo 004 powered Me-262 V2 PC+UB was a clear improvement. Wendel
later praised the hybrid jet but he discovered that the Me-262 was a
double-edged sword when it came to performance. He reported that takeoff was
extremely difficult. The throttle had to be advanced slowly not to mention the
high speed that had to be reached before the jet could lift of. It took a lot
of runway to accomplish this, but once in the air, it was a pleasure to fly.
That day Wendel reached a top speed of 541mph at 30,000ft however, his flight
was cut short by engine failure forcing him to use his auxiliary piston engine
yet again to land safely. The short-comings of that first prototype ultimately
led to the improvements shown in the subsequent prototypes.
On
18 July, 1942, the piston engine was removed and the third prototype Me 262 V3
PC+UC finally had both feet in the jet age. It was the first prototype to fly
on jet power alone. However, it still had that dreaded tail-dragger landing
gear configuration. The landing gear made it difficult to lift the tail from
the ground as the jet reached flight speed. The excessive turbulence from the
engines rendered the controls nearly useless during take-off and landing. Wendel
skillfully found ways to overcome some of these problems. On takeoff, Wendel
discovered that as he accelerated down the runway and gently tapping the
breaks, the tail rose up and the jet took off. It became clear that the Me-262
was not for the faint hearted and should not be flown by inexperienced pilots.
If
we fast forward to 6 June, 1943, one year from the Allied invasion of Normandy,
the Me-262 prototype evolved significantly and equipped with some new touches.
The tail-dragger landing gear configuration which was common for piston engine
fighters was altered. Instead, it featured a tricycle landing gear
configuration and lighter but not so reliable Jumo 004A-0 engines. The new
landing gear solved the previous problems but also created new ones. The nose
wheel was flimsy and could not rotate which made it difficult to taxi the aircraft.
To address the long takeoff distance, the new prototype was fitted with RATO
(Rocket Assisted Takeoff). The results were promising and took 300yds off the
jets’ takeoff run. Unfortunately, when Professor Messerschmitt appealed to the German
Air Ministry to use RATO for all production Me-262s, they refused. Had they
gone along with Messerschmitt’s request, one of the many weak points of the 262
might have been addressed. The lengthy takeoff run ultimately became one of the
many unresolved problems that bled into the 262s combat career.
The
closing of 1943 proved to be a pivotal point for the Me-262. On top of the
technical problems that slipped through the engineering cracks, the role of the
jet was also in question. In December, Adolf Hitler attended a demonstration of
the Me-262 at Insterburg. This is where many Luftwaffe historians like to point
the finger at Hitler for single handedly murdering the Me-262. According to
General Adolf Galland, who attended the demonstration, Hitler declared “For
years I have demanded from the Luftwaffe a ‘speed bomber,’ which can reach its
target in spite of enemy fighter defense. In the aircraft you present to me as
a fighter plane I see the ‘Blitz bomber,’ with which I will repel the invasion
in its first and weakest phase”. He believed that by implementing the 262 as a shnellbomber
(fast bomber), its speed could allow it to penetrate Allied
air-cover and repel the imminent invasion of occupied Europe. However, Hitler was a layperson who had no
business with military strategy and even worse, his tactical decisions clearly stemmed
from his obsession with offensive, revenge attacks against England. Galland, on
the other hand, had more tactical sense in his finger than in Hitlers entire
body and was fully aware that the priority of the Luftwaffe was reclaiming air
superiority. In fact, General Eisenhower remarked that the Normandy invasion
would not have been possible without the success of the pattern bombing
campaign. Albert Speer, who was also present, recorded in his memoirs that
every effort was made to convince Hitler about the Jet’s tactical importance as
a fighter to help thwart the relentless Allied bombing crusade. Speer recalled the
more he and Galland tried to convince Hitler of that, the more he resisted. Was
this the moment that murdered the 262? No, Hitler’s unilateral decision to use
the jet as a bomber by itself did not delay its production. Rather, it was a
variety of factors including that fateful decision. Operation Big Week resulted
in the destruction of key 262 factories at Augsburg and Regensburg. On top of
that, engine development was always behind the progress of the airframe and
production had to wait for the engineers to catch-up. So, production of the
Me-262 Sturmvogel (Stormbird) began with only a limited number of
fighter variants sneaking off the assembly lines. Its future as the fighter
Germany desperately needed looked bleak. So far…
KG-51
was the first bomber unit to transition from conventional aircraft like the
Ju-88 to the Me-262 jets. Since the 262 was best suited as a fighter, the
decision to use it as a bomber resulted in catastrophic losses. Galland
recorded in his memoirs “Actually the ME-262 possessed no fixtures for
releasing bombs or bombsights. According to its flying properties and its
safety conditions it was highly unsuited for an aimed bomb release, diving or
gliding were out of the question because of the unavoidable excess of the
permissible top speed”. The pilots of KG-51 had no serious experience with
aggressive tactics. Speed, their only saving grace, was stripped away by the
ordinance they carried as the additional weight and drag reduced their top
speed by 75mph. By now, production Me-262’s received by KG-51 were powered by
the first mass produced jet engine in history, the Jumo 004B. Even though the
new engine was a clear improvement over previous ones, reliability remained an
issue. Engines only lasted about 10 hours before they required replacement and
on top of that, fuel consumption was off the charts. The Me-262 was a flying,
gas guzzler and its fuel consumption was so inefficient, it could only stay
aloft for about an hour. The only good news was that jet engines burned a
different type of low-octane fuel that was cheaper and far more abundant called
kerosene. The 262’s of KG-51 were not deployed until shortly after the Allied
invasion of Normandy. By then the Allies sank their teeth too deep into France
to make a difference. It was too late for Hitler’s vision for the 262 to come
to fruition. All they could do was carry out nuisance raids against Allied
bases throughout France.

On
26 July, 1944, an Allied fighter pilot squared off with a 262 for the first
time. 2nd Leutnant Alfred Schrieber, encountered an RAF Mosquito fighter flown
by Flight Lt. Albert E.
“Bert”
Wall and navigator Albert Sinclair “Jock” Lobban. Schrieber pursued, opened
fire and scored several hits forcing the “mozzie” to disengage and retreat to
Fermo, Italy. Mosquito fighters were a major thorn in the side of the Luftwaffe
primarily because its wooden construction and twin Rolls Royce Merlin engines
gave it fantastic speed. It was fast, nimble and an ideal pathfinder during
night bombing raids. But, Schrieber reported the encounter as a victory, when,
in fact, the RAF fighter did manage to escape by out-turning him. The false
news eventually reached Hitler causing him to believe the Me-262 was the answer
to the “mozzie” scourge. The harsh truth is that it wasn’t, at all. The Me-262
had the speed advantage, but it didn’t have a prayer in a turning fight with any
Allied fighter.
The
first confirmed victory for the 262 was scored by the newly formed unit
designated Kommando Nowotny on August 8th. Coincidentally, the
victim of the encounter was also an RAF Mosquito fighter. Kommando Nowotny was
the world’s first operational all jet combat unit named for its leader, Walter
Nowotny. It evolved from Ekdo (Test Command) 262 led by Captain Werner Thierfelder.
Only the very elite Luftwaffe pilots made the cut to serve on its roster for
obvious reasons. On July 18th 1944, Nowotny’s predecessor, was
killed in action over Bavaria. Since Allied records do not indicate that he was
shot down, it is reasonable to speculate that a technical problem with his own
aircraft may have caused his death. Thierfelders fate is further proof of the
262’s fatal flaws. Handicaps like the 262’s extremely touchy throttle,
unreliable engines, flimsy nose wheel and lack of stability during takeoff
caused about 200 pilots to die in training alone. Herman Buchner once recalled
the failure of his jets nose wheel: “I slammed my 262 onto the landing strip
doing two hundred sixty kilometers per hour and suddenly saw a wheel running in
front of me. It had broken off the end of the axle during the hard landing and
the wheel had now separated. The aircraft swerved to the left, but, with a
great deal of effort and additional help from the left engine, I succeeded in
keeping the machine going more or less in the right direction and steered
passed a fuel truck. After a few frightening seconds I brought my jet to a
standstill. All went well, and the machine only needed a new undercarriage.”
Every
pilot that climbed in that cockpit had to nurse the throttle with extreme care.
Any sudden movements could cause the engines to burst into flames and carene
down the runway in an uncontrolled ball of fire. If a successful takeoff was
achieved you had to be careful about tight turns and speed reduction when
attacking. George Peter Eder described takeoff and landing with the 262: “The
throttle response was slow, and if pushed forward too soon resulted in
flameouts, so in combat we just set the throttles at full forward and only
reduced power gradually as required, such as landing. To bleed off airspeed, we
just raised the nose and left the throttles alone. We operated the throttle
gently to prevent any quick changes to the engines. Later the automatic
throttle regulator was installed on some aircraft, but it did not always solve
the problem. The technology was just so new, and we were the guinea pigs, so
that was the problem”. The chain that linked the 30mm rounds sometimes broke
under the high stress caused by tight turns. Diving at 30-40,000ft where air is
cool and thin was relatively safe, but diving at lower altitudes where air is
denser meant almost certain death. Drag from the dense air at the edge of the
sound barrier caused critical controls to freeze damming the fate of the
aircraft. For the first jet fighter pilots, returning to base was also
dangerous since they had to reduce their speed. Allied fighter pilots often
stalked 262s from a distance waiting for them to land. As German pilots dropped
their throttles and flaps lowered, Allied fighters dove out of the sun and shot
them down. Unlike conventional fighters, a landing in a 262 could not be
aborted because it would take too long to advance the throttle and pick-up
flight speed again.
After
the initial shock of the 262s debut in battle, Allied fighter pilots learned
that the jet could be beaten. For instance, by diving, they could convert
altitude to speed and catch the 262. Slower, piston engine fighters could also
turn tighter and their ability to suddenly slowdown could force the jets to
overshoot them in a dogfight. The primary causes for the meager success
achieved by Kommando Nowotny was the position of their bases near the front
lines. Allied fighters often circled above known Me-262 airfields waiting to
strafe them during takeoff or landing. On 7 October, 1944, 1st Lt.
Urban L. “Ben” Drew and his squadron strafed the Nowotny base at Achmer. Drew
recalled: “I watched them for a while and saw one of them start to taxi. The
lead ship was in takeoff position for a formation takeoff. I waited until they
were both airborne and then I rolled over from 15,000 feet and headed for the attack
with my flight behind me”. Since it took several minutes for 262s to reach top
speed, Drew was able to bag one only 1,000 feet of the ground. The Germans were
supposed to have air cover patrols flown by piston engine Fw-109 D fighters
from JG-54 but none were around that day. 262 airbases also attempted to cover
landing jets with heavy anti-aircraft batteries. On November 8th,
the anti-aircraft batteries couldn’t stop Major Walter Nowotnys luck from running
out when his port engine burst into flames during an interception sortie,
forcing him to return to Achmer. P-51 pilot Edward R. “Buddy” Haydon sighted
the flames and quickly closed the range on Nowotnys crippled jet like a shark
that smelled blood. They both descended to just 100 feet from the ground putting
Haydon safely under the umbrella of flack that erupted from the airfield.
Nowotnys fate was sealed as he made his final approach. Since he was flying on
one engine, Nowotny was losing speed fast and before Haydon could pull the
trigger, the jet stalled and snaped to the left crashing in the forest below.
The
24 October, 1945 mission flown by the Tuskegee Airmen is yet another shining
example of how Allied pilots adapted to the Me-262 threat. Not only was it the
longest escort mission (1,600 miles) of the war, but it was also their first clash
with the jets. They were tasked with escorting bombers from the 15th
AF targeting a Daimler Benz tank factory in Berlin. About thirty Me-262 jets
from JG-7 arrived to intercept the bombers. Three jets were shot down during
the mission by Charles Brantley, Earl Lane, and Roscoe Brown. Brown recalled
shooting down Oberleutnant (Lt. Col.) Franz Kulp. “All of a sudden at nine
o’clock I saw these streaks. I ordered, ‘Drop your tanks and follow me.’ I did
a split S, went under the bombers, did a hard right, pulled up, shot the jet,
blew him up and that was the first jet victory for the 15th Air
Force”. Earl R. Lane became tangled in a tight left turn with another 262 flown
by ace Alfred Ambs. Lane was able to pull lead and open fire from about 2,000
yards. Lane recalled, “He did not quite fill my gunsight. I fired three short
bursts and saw the plane emitting smoke. A piece of the plane, either the
canopy or one of the jet orifices, flew off. I then pulled up and circled over
the spot where he went down. I saw a crash and a puff of black smoke.” The
Me-262 was clearly ill equipped to dogfight with piston fighters, but it was
hardwired with the tools to bring down heavy bombers.
The
pilots of Kommando Nowotny drastically altered their standard interception
tactics around the speed of the Me-262. For the Luftwaffe, bombers were
typically attacked head-on from twelve o-clock high but that approach would
never work for jet pilots. American B-17s flew at about 280mph and the Me-262 knifed
through the air at 540mph. The closing speed of the two aircraft in a head-on
pass would be too high for any jet pilot to select a target, aim and score hits
without colliding with their intended target. That is why the pilots of
Kommando Nowotny transitioned away from frontal interception tactics. Instead, 262
pilots hunted American bomber formations from six o-clock high or streaking in
from either side. Interception tactics had to be further refined to accommodate
the limited range of the 262s armament of four, three-centimeter cannons.
Three-centimeter guns only had an effective range of about 250 meters compared
to the 800-meter range of .50 caliber guns on a B-17. The limited range of the
jet’s cannons made it vulnerable to American gunners. The Luftwaffe patched up
the jet’s Achilles heel by equipping the 262 with twenty-four R4M rockets. Since
the rockets had an effective range of 900-1,200 meters, pilots could knock down
bombers before flying in range of gunners.
Yes,
the 262 put a dent in the number of Allied bombers but the damage was already
done. The pattern bombing campaign brought Germany’s war effort to its knees
forcing the feared Me-262 into a dark, cryptic underworld. Since factories
above ground were being destroyed at such an alarming rate, the Germans resorted
to a cheap and haphazard solution by converting mines into underground
factories throughout the Reich. The REIMAHG (Flugzeuwerk Reichmarshall Herman
Göring) factory was a porcelain mine located in the Walpersberg hill near
Kahla. There, gaunt prisoners from concentration and POW camps replaced trained
workers Germany was critically short on. They constructed bunkers with
steel-reinforced concrete up to 10 meters thick rendering the factory nearly
bomb-proof. The components of the 262 were sent from the Messerschmitt Co. for
final assembly at the REIMAHG. Assembly of main components (wings, fuselage and
tail) took place above ground inside concrete bunkers along the base of the
hill. Across the hilltop stretched a 3,300-foot runway for the factory fresh
jets to be launched from for delivery to their combat units. Delivering the
jets to their combat units was a daunting task. Since the runway was barely
long enough for takeoff, RATO was required and there was no turning back. Use
of unskilled labor should have caused significantly more accidents during delivery
to the front lines as well as during combat. Surprisingly, the only known
accident occurred on 23 February, 1945 resulting in the death of Feldwebel Otto
Soltav near Calbe. It is reasonable to hypothesize that since the components of
the 262 were manufactured at the Messerschmitt Co., the skilled work was
already completed. By the time the preassembled components arrived, the
prisoners were left with the final assembly of the aircraft. Since the 262 was
a significant problem for Allied heavy bombers, 262 bases also became high
priority tactical targets. Frequent bombing and strafing of 262 bases forced
them to retreat to the shadows of forests and under bridges. The haphazard
conditions surrounding the 262s late war production made it even more of a
danger to its own pilots.

Even
though Germany’s fate was sealed in utter defeat, she certainly won the race to
the jet age. The Me-262 was undoubtedly the most successful of the Luftwaffe’s
experimental endeavors. By the end of the war, 262s shot down about 542 total
Allied aircraft to the loss of only 100 jets in air-to-air combat. Although
about 1,400 Me-262s were produced by the end of the war, only 300 ever saw combat.
The 262 certainly instilled fear in the hearts of Allied pilots but it arrived
too late to ever achieve tactical success. For Hitler, the 262 was nothing more
than a pipe-dream and a last-ditch attempt to resurrect victory from defeat.
One thing remains certain, the 262 changed air combat forever both
technologically and tactically and became the aviation standard for all future
conflicts.